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Abstract. The vast number of interleavings that a concurrent program
can have is typically identified as the root cause of the difficulty of auto-
matic analysis of concurrent software. Weak memory is generally believed
to make this problem even harder. We address both issues by modelling
programs’ executions with partial orders rather than the interleaving se-
mantics (SC). We implemented a software analysis tool based on these
ideas. It scales to programs of sufficient size to achieve first-time formal
verification of non-trivial concurrent systems code over a wide range of
models, including SC, Intel x86 and IBM Power.
1 Introduction
Automatic analysis of concurrent programs is a practical challenge. Hardly any
of the very few existing tools for concurrency will verify a thousand lines of
code [21]. Most papers name the number of thread interleavings that a concur-
rent program can have as a reason for the difficulty. This view presupposes an
execution model, namely Sequential Consistency (SC) [47], where an execution
is a total order (more precisely an interleaving) of the instructions from different
threads. The choice of SC as the execution model poses at least two problems.
First, the large number of interleavings modelling the executions of a program
makes their enumeration intractable. Context bounded methods [59,54,45,23]
(which are unsound in general) and partial order reduction [56,31,26] can reduce
the number of interleavings to consider, but still suffer from limited scalabil-
ity. Second, modern multiprocessors (e.g., Intel x86 or IBM Power) serve as a
reminder that SC is an inappropriate model. Indeed, the weak memory models
implemented by these chips allow more behaviours than SC.
We address these two issues by using partial orders to model executions,
following [58,64,10,57]. We also aim at practical verification of concurrent pro-
grams [17,19,23]. Rarely have these two communities met. Notable exceptions
are [61,62], forming with [14] the closest related work. We show that the explicit
use of partial orders generalises these works to concurrency at large, from SC to
weak memory, without affecting efficiency.
Our method is as follows: we map a program to a formula consisting of two
parts. The first conjunct describes the data and control flow for each thread of
the program; the second conjunct describes the concurrent executions of these
threads as partial orders. We prove that for any satisfying assignment of this
formula there is a valid execution w.r.t. our models; and conversely, any valid
execution gives rise to a satisfying assignment of the formula.
Thus, given an analysis for sequential programs (the per-thread conjunct),
we obtain an analysis for concurrent programs. For programs with bounded
loops, we obtain a sound and complete model checking method. Otherwise, if
the program has unbounded loops, we obtain an exhaustive analysis up to a
given bound on loop unrollings, i.e., a bounded model checking method.
To experiment with our approach, we implement a symbolic decision proce-
dure answering reachability queries over concurrent C programs w.r.t. a given
memory model. We support a wide range of models, including SC, Intel x86 and
IBM Power. To exercise our tool w.r.t. weak memory, we verify 4500 tests used
to validate formal models against IBM Power chips [60,50]. Our tool is the first
to handle the subtle store atomicity relaxation [4] specific to Power and ARM.
We show that mutual exclusion is not violated in a queue mechanism of the
Apache HTTP server software. We confirm a bug in the worker synchronisation
mechanism in PostgreSQL, and that adding two fences fixes the problem. We
verify that the Read-Copy-Update mechanism of the Linux kernel preserves data
consistency of the object it is protecting. For all examples we perform the analysis
for a wide range of memory models, from SC to IBM Power via Intel x86.
We provide the sources of our tool, our experimental logs and our benchmarks
at http://www.cprover.org/wpo.
2 Related Work
We start with models of concurrency, then review tools proving the absence of
bugs in concurrent software, organised by techniques.
Models of concurrency Formal methods traditionally build on Lamport’s SC [47].
A year earlier, Lamport defined happens-before models [46]. The happens-before
order is the smallest partial order containing the program order and the relation
between a write, and a read from this write.
These models seem well suited for analyses relative to synchronisation, e.g., [22,25,40],
because the relations they define are oblivious to the implementation of the id-
ioms. Despite happens-before being a partial order, most of [46] explains how
to linearise it. Hence, this line of work often relies on a notion of total orders.
Partial orders, however, have been successfully applied in verification in the con-
text of Petri nets [53], which have been linked to software verification in [41] for
programs with a small state space.
We (and [15,29,61,62]) reuse the clocks of [46] to build our orders. Yet we
do not aim at linearisation or a transitive closure, as this leads to a polynomial
overhead of redundant constraints.
Our work goes beyond the definition and simulation of memory models [32,37,63,60,50].
Implementing an executable version of the memory models is an important step,
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but we go further by studying the validity of systems code in C (as opposed to
assembly or toy languages) w.r.t. both a given memory model and a property.
The style of the model influences the verification process. Memory models
roughly fall into two classes: operational and axiomatic. The operational style
models executions via interleavings, with transitions accessing buffers or queues,
in addition to the memory (as on SC). Thus this approach inherits the limitations
of interleaving-based verification. For example, [9] (restricted to Sun Total Store
Order, TSO) bounds the number of context switches.
Other methods use operational specifications of TSO, Sun Partial Store
Order (PSO) and Relaxed Memory Order (RMO) to place fences in a pro-
gram [44,43,49]. Abdulla et al. [3] address this problem on an operational TSO,
for finite state transition systems instead of programs. The methods of [44,43]
have, in the words of [49], “severely limited scalability”. The dynamic technique
presented in [49] scales to 771 lines but does not aim to be sound: the tool picks
an invalid execution, repairs it, then iterates.
Axiomatic specifications categorise behaviours by constraining relations on
memory accesses. Several hardware vendors adopt this style [1,2] of specification;
we build on the axiomatic framework of [8] (cf. Sec. 3). CheckFence [14] also uses
axiomatic specifications, but does not handle the store atomicity relaxation of
Power and ARM.
#define N 5
int x=1, y=1;
void thr1() {
for(int k=0; k<N; ++k)
x=x+y; }
void thr2() {
for(int k=0; k<N; ++k)
y=y+x; }
int main() {
start thread(thr1);
start thread(thr2);
assert(x<=144 && y<=144);
return 0; }
Prog. 1. Fibonacci from [11]
Running example Below we use Prog. 1
(from the TACAS Software Verification
Competition [11]) as an illustration. The
shared variables x and y can reach the (2N)-
th Fibonacci number, depending on the in-
terleaving of thr1 and thr2. Prog. 1 permits
at least O(26N) interleavings of thr1 and
thr2. In each loop iteration, thr1 reads x and
then y, and then writes x; thr2 reads y and x,
and then writes y. Each interleaving of these
two writes yields a unique sequence of shared
memory states. Swapping, e.g., the read of y
in thr2 with the write of x in thr1 does not
affect the memory states, but swapping the
accesses to the same address does.
Interleaving tools Traditionally, tools are based on interleavings, and do not
consider weak memory. By contrast, we handle weak memory by reasoning in
terms of partial orders.
Explicit-state model checking performs a search over states of a transition
system. SPIN [36], VeriSoft [30] and Java PathFinder [35,38] implement this
approach; they adopt various forms of partial order reduction (POR) to cope
with the number of interleavings.
POR reduces soundly the number of interleavings to study [56,31,26] by
observing that a partial order gives rise to a class of interleavings [51], then
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picking only one interleaving in each class. Prog. 1 is an instance where the effect
of POR is limited. We noted in Sec. 2 that amongst the O(26N) interleavings
permitted by Prog. 1, only the interleavings of the writes give rise to unique
sequences of states. Hence distinct interleavings of the threads representing the
same interleavings of the writes are candidates for reduction. POR reduces the
number of interleavings by at least 22N, but O(24N) interleavings remain.
Explicit-state methods may fail to cope with large state spaces, even in a
sequential setting. Symbolic encodings [13] can help, but the state space of-
ten needs further reduction using, e.g., bounded model checking (BMC) [12] or
predicate abstraction [33]. These techniques may again also be combined with
POR. ESBMC [19] implements BMC. An instance of Prog. 1 has a fixed N, i.e.,
bounded loops. Thus BMC with N as bound is sound and complete for such an
instance. ESBMC verifies Prog. 1 for N = 10 within 30mins (cf. Sec. 6, Fig. 8).
SatAbs [17] uses predicate abstraction in a CEGAR loop; it completes no more
than N = 3 in 30 mins as it needs multiple predicates per interleaving, resulting
in many refinement iterations. Our approach easily scales to, e.g., N = 50, in less
than 20 s, and more than N=300 within 30mins, as we build only a polynomial
number of constraints, at worst cubic in the number of accesses to a given shared
memory address.
Non-interleaving tools Another line of tools is not based on interleavings. The
existing approaches do not handle weak memory and are either incomplete (i.e.,
fail to prove the absence of a bug) or unsound (i.e., might miss a bug due to the
assumptions they make).
Thread-modular reasoning [39,24,28,27,34] is sound, but usually incomplete.
Each read presumes guarantees about the values provided by the environment.
Empty guarantees amount to fully non-deterministic values, thus this is a triv-
ially sound approach. Our translation of Sec. 4 corresponds to empty guarantees.
The constraints of Sec. 5, however, make our encoding complete.
In Prog. 1, if we guarantee x<=144 && y<=144, the problem becomes trivial,
but finding this guarantee automatically is challenging. Threader [34] fails for
N=1 (cf. Sec. 6, Fig. 8).
Context bounded methods fix an arbitrary bound on context switches [59,54,45,23].
This supposes that most bugs happen with few context switches. Our method
does not make this restriction. Moreover, we believe that there is no obvious
generalisation of these works to weak memory, other than instrumentation as [9]
does for TSO, i.e., adding information to a program so that its SC executions
simulate its weak ones. We used our tool in SC mode, and applied the instru-
mentation of [9] to it. On average, the instrumentation is 9 times more costly
(cf. Sec. 6, Fig. 8).
In Prog. 1, we need at least N context switches to disprove the assertion
assert (x<=143 && y<=143) (or any upper bound to x and y that is the (2N)-th
Fibonacci number minus 1). The hypothesis of the approach (i.e., small context
bounds suffice to find a bug) does not apply here; Poirot fails for N≥ 1 (cf Sec. 6,
Fig. 8).
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P0 P1
(a) x← 1 (c) y← 1
(b) r1← y (d) r2← x
Allowed? r1=0; r2=0
(a)Wx1
(b)Ry0
(c)Wy1
(d)Rx0
po
fr
po
fr
Fig. 1. Store Buffering (sb)
Our work relates the most to [14,29,61,62]; we discuss [29] below and de-
tail [14,61,62] in Sec. 5.7. These works use axiomatic specifications of SC to
compose the distinct threads. CheckFence [14] models SC with total orders and
transitive closure constraints; [61,62] use partial orders like us. [61,62] note re-
dundancies of their constraints, but do not explain them; our semantic founda-
tions (Sec. 3) allow us both to explain their redundancies and avoid them (cf.
Sec. 5.7).
The encodings of [14,61,62] are O(N3) for N shared memory accesses to
any address ; [29] is quadratic, but in the number of threads times the number
of per-thread transitions, which may include arbitrary many local accesses. Our
encoding isO(M3), withM the maximal number of events for a single address. By
contrast, the encodings of [29,61,62] quantify over all addresses. Prog. 1 has two
addresses only, but the difference is already significant: (6N)3 for [14,29,61,62]
vs. 2 × (3M)3 in our case, i.e. 1/4 of the constraints (cf. Sec. 6, Fig. 7 for other
case studies).
3 Context: Axiomatic Memory Model
We use the framework of [8], which provably embraces several architectures :
SC [47], Sun TSO (i.e. the x86 model [55]), PSO and RMO, Alpha, and a frag-
ment of Power. We present this framework via litmus tests, as shown in Fig. 1.
The keyword allowed asks if the architecture permits the outcome “r1=1;r2=0;
r3=1;r4=0”. This relates to the event graphs of this program, composed of re-
lations over read and write memory events. A store instruction (e.g. x ← 1 on
P0) corresponds to a write event ( (a)Wx1), and a load (e.g. r1← y on P0) to a
read ( (b) Ry0). The validity of an execution boils down to the absence of certain
cycles in the event graph. Indeed, an architecture allows an execution when it
represents a consensus amongst the processors. A cycle in an event graph is a
potential violation of this consensus.
If a graph has a cycle, we check if the architecture relaxes some relations. The
consensus ignores relaxed relations, hence becomes acyclic, i.e. the architecture
allows the final state. In Fig. 1, on SC where nothing is relaxed, the cycle forbids
the execution. x86 relaxes the program order (po in Fig. 1) between writes and
reads, thus a forbidding cycle no longer exists for (a, b) and (c, d) are relaxed.
Executions Formally, an event is a read or a write memory access, composed of
a unique identifier, a direction R for read or W for write, a memory address,
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P0 P1 P2 P3
(a) r1← x (c) r3← y (e) x← 1 (f) y← 1
(b) r2← y (d) r4← x
Allowed? r1=1; r2=0; r3=1; r4=0;
(a)Rx1
(b)Ry0
(c) Ry1
(d)Rx0
(e)Wx1 (f)Wy1
po po
rf
fr
rf
fr
Fig. 2. Independent Reads of Independent Writes (iriw)
and a value. We represent each instruction by the events it issues. In Fig. 2, we
associate the store x← 1 on processor P2 to the event (e) Wx1.
We associate the program with an event structure E , (E, po), composed of
its events E and the program order po, a per-processor total order. We write dp
for the relation (included in po, the source being a read) modelling dependencies
between instructions, e.g. an address dependency occurs when computing the
address of a load or store from the value of a preceding load.
Then, we represent the communication between processors leading to the final
state via an execution witness X , (ws, rf), which consists of two relations over
the events. First, the write serialisation ws is a per-address total order on writes
which models the memory coherence widely assumed by modern architectures
. It links a write w to any write w′ to the same address that hits the memory
after w. Second, the read-from relation rf links a write w to a read r such that
r reads the value written by w.
We include the writes in the consensus via the write serialisation. Unfortu-
nately, the read-from map does not give us enough information to embed the
reads as well. To that aim, we derive the from-read relation fr from ws and rf. A
read r is in fr with a write w when the write w′ from which r reads hit the memory
before w did. Formally, we have: (r, w) ∈ fr , ∃w′, (w′, r) ∈ rf ∧ (w′, w) ∈ ws.
In Fig. 2, the outcome corresponds to the execution on the right if each
memory location and register initially holds 0. If r1=1 in the end, the read (a)
read its value from the write (e) on P2, hence (e, a) ∈ rf. If r2=0, the read (b) read
its value from the initial state, thus before the write (f) on P3, hence (b, f) ∈ fr.
Similarly, we have (f, c) ∈ rf from r3=1, and (d, e) ∈ fr from r4=0.
Relaxed or safe A processor can commit a write w first to a store buffer, then to
a cache, and finally to memory. When a write hits the memory, all the processors
agree on its value. But when the write w transits in store buffers and caches,
a processor can read its value through a read r before the value is actually
available to all processors from the memory. In this case, the read-from relation
between the write w and the read r does not contribute to the consensus, since
the reading occurs in advance.
We model this by some subrelation of the read-from rf being relaxed, i.e.
not included in the consensus. When a processor can read from its own store
buffer [4] (the typical TSO/x86 scenario), we relax the internal read-from rfi.
When two processors P0 and P1 can communicate privately via a cache (a case
of write atomicity relaxation [4]), we relax the external read-from rfe, and call
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the corresponding write non-atomic. This is the main particularity of Power or
ARM, and cannot happen on TSO/x86.
Some program-order pairs are relaxed (e.g. write-read pairs on x86), i.e. only
a subset of po is guaranteed to occur in this order.
When a relation is not relaxed, we call it safe. Architectures provide special
fence (or barrier) instructions, to prevent weak behaviours. Following [8], the
relation fence ⊆ po induced by a fence is non-cumulative when it orders certain
pairs of events surrounding the fence, i.e. fence is safe. The relation fence is
cumulative when it makes writes atomic, e.g. by flushing caches. The relation
fence is A-cumulative (resp. B-cumulative) if rfe; fence (resp. fence; rfe) is safe.
When stores are atomic (i.e. rfe is safe), e.g. on TSO, we do not need cumulativity.
Architectures An architecture A determines the set safeA of the relations safe on
A, i.e. the relations embedded in the consensus. Following [8], we consider the
write serialisation ws and the from-read relation fr to be always safe. SC relaxes
nothing, i.e. rf and po are safe. TSO authorises the reordering of write-read pairs
and store buffering (i.e. poWR and rfi are relaxed) but nothing else. We denote
the safe subset of read-from, i.e. the read-from relation globally agreed on by all
processors, by grf.
Finally, an execution (E,X) is valid on A when the three following condi-
tions hold. 1. SC holds per address, i.e. the communication and the program
order for accesses with same address po-loc are compatible: uniproc(E,X) ,
acyclic(ws ∪ rf ∪ fr ∪ po-loc). 2. Values do not come out of thin air, i.e. there is no
causal loop: thin(E,X) , acyclic(rf ∪ dp). 3. There is a consensus, i.e. the safe re-
lations do not form a cycle: consensus(E,X) , acyclic((ws ∪ rf ∪ fr ∪ po) ∩ safeA).
Formally: validA(E,X) , uniproc(E,X) ∧ thin(E,X) ∧ consensus(E,X).
From the validity of executions we deduce a comparison of architectures: We
say that an architecture A2 is stronger than another one A1 when the executions
valid on A2 are valid on A1. Equivalently we would say that A1 is weaker than
A2. Thus, SC is stronger than any other architecture discussed above.
4 Symbolic event structures
For an architecture A and one execution witness X , the framework of Sec. 3
determines if X is valid on A. To prove reachability of a program state, we
need to reason about all its executions. To do so efficiently, we use symbolic
representations capturing all possible executions in a single constraint system.
We then apply SAT or SMT solvers to decide if a valid execution exists for A,
and, if so, get a satisfying assignment corresponding to an execution witness.
As said in Sec. 1, we build two conjuncts. The first one, ssa, represents the
data and control flow per thread. The second, pord, captures the communica-
tions between threads (cf. Sec. 5). We include a reachability property in ssa; the
program has a valid execution violating the property iff ssa ∧ pord is satisfiable.
We mostly use static single assignment form (SSA) of the input program to
build ssa (cf. [42] for details). In this SSA variant, each equation is augmented
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with a guard : the guard is the disjunction over all conjunctions of branching
guards on paths to the assignment. To deal with concurrency, we use a fresh
index for each occurrence of a given shared memory variable, resulting in a fresh
symbol in the formula. CheckFence [14] and [61,62] use a similarly modified
encoding.
Together with ssa, we build a symbolic event structure (ses). As detailed
below, it captures basic program information needed to build the second conjunct
pord in Sec. 5. Fig. 3 illustrates this section: the formula ssa on top corresponds
to the ses beneath.
main P0 P1 P2 P3
x0 = 0
∧ y0 = 0 ∧ r110 = x1 ∧ r3
2
0 = y2 ∧ x3 = 1 ∧ y3 = 1
∧ r210 = y1 ∧ r4
2
0 = x2
∧ prop
(i0)Wxx0
(i1)Wyy0
(a) Rxx1 (c) Ryy2 (e) Wxx3 (f) Wyy3
(b) Ryy1 (d) Rxx2
Fig. 3. The formula ssa for iriw (Fig. 2) with prop = (r110 = 1 ∧ r2
1
0 = 0 ∧ r3
2
0 =
1 ∧ r420 = 0), and its ses (guards omitted since all true)
Static single assignment form (SSA) To encode ssa we use a variant of SSA [20]
and loop unrolling. The details of this encoding are in [42], except for differences
in the handling of shared memory variables, as explained below.
In SSA, each occurrence of a program variable is annotated with an index.
We turn assignments in SSA form into equalities, with distinct indexes yielding
distinct symbols in the resulting equation. For example, the assignment x:=x+1
results in the equality x1 = x0 + 1. We use unique indexes for assignments
in loops via loop unrolling: repeating x:=x+1 twice yields x1 = x0 + 1 and
x2 = x1 + 1. Control flow join points yield additional equations involving the
guards of branches merging at this point (see [42] for details).
In concurrent programs, we also need to consider join points due to com-
munication between threads, i.e., concurrent SSA form (CSSA) [48]. To deal
with weaker models, we use a fresh index for each occurrence of a given shared
memory variable, resulting in a fresh symbol in the formula. Thus, each occur-
rence may take non-deterministic values, i.e. this approach over-approximates
the behaviours of a program. If x is shared in the above example, the modified
SSA encoding of the second loop unrolling becomes x3 = x2 + 1, breaking any
causality between the first loop iteration (encoded as x1 = x0+1) and the second
one. Sinha and Wang [61,62] use the same approach, but since they consider SC
only, their use of fresh indexes may produce more symbols than necessary.
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By adding the negation of the reachability property to be checked to our
(over-approximating) SSA equations, we obtain a formula ssa that is satisfiable
if there exists a (concurrent) counterexample violating the property. As this is an
over-approximation, the converse need not be true, i.e., a satisfying assignment
of ssa may constitute a spurious counterexample. Sec. 5 restores precision using
the pord constraints derived from the ses.
In ssa, memory addresses map to unique symbols via the (symbolic) pointer
dereferencing of [42, Sec. 4]. In the weak memory case, we ensure this by using
analyses sound for this setting [6].
The top of Fig. 3 gives ssa for Fig. 2. We print a column per thread, vertically
following the control flow, but it forms a single conjunction. Each occurrence of
a program variable carries its SSA index as a subscript. Each occurrence of the
shared memory variables x and y has a unique SSA index. Here we omit the
guards, as this program does not use branching or loops.
From SSA to symbolic event structures A symbolic event structure (ses) γ ,
(S, po) is a set S of symbolic events and a symbolic program order po. A symbolic
event holds a symbolic value instead of a concrete one as in Sec. 3. We define
g(e) to be the Boolean guard of a symbolic event e, which corresponds to the
guard of the SSA equation as introduced above. We use these guards to build
the executions of Sec. 3: a guard evaluates to true if the branch is taken, false
otherwise. The symbolic program order po(γ) gives a list of symbolic events per
thread of the program. The order of two events in po(γ) gives the program order
in a concrete execution if both guards are true.
Note that po(γ) is an implementation-dependent linearisation of the branch-
ing structure of a thread, induced by the path merging applied while constructing
the SSA form. For instance, if e1 then e2 else e3 could be linearised as ei-
ther (e1, e2, e3) or (e1, e3, e2) as any two events of a concrete execution (e1 and
e2, or e1 and e3) remain in program order. The original branching structure, i.e.,
the unlinearised symbolic program order induced by the control flow graph, is
maintained in the relation po-br(γ). For the above example, po-br(γ) contains
(e1, e2) and (e1, e3).
We build the ses γ alongside the SSA form, as follows. Each occurrence of
a shared program variable on the right-hand side of an assignment becomes a
symbolic read, with the SSA-indexed variable as symbolic value, and the guard
is taken from the SSA equation. Similarly, each occurrence of a shared program
variable on the left-hand side becomes a symbolic write. Fences do not affect
memory states in a sequential setting, hence do not appear in SSA equations.
We simply add a fence event to the ses when we see a fence. We take the order
of assignments per thread as program order, and mark thread spawn points.
At the bottom of Fig. 3, we give the ses of iriw. Each column represents the
symbolic program order, per thread. We use the same notation as for the events
of Sec. 3, but values are SSA symbols. Guards are omitted again, as they all are
trivially true. We depict the thread spawn events by starting the program order
in the appropriate row. Note that we choose to put the two initialisation writes
in program order on the main thread.
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From symbolic to concrete event structures To relate to the models of Sec. 3, we
concretise symbolic events. A satisfying assignment to ssa ∧ pord, as computed
by a SAT or SMT solver, induces, for each symbolic event, a concrete value
(if it is a read or a write) and a valuation of its guard (for both accesses and
fences). A valuation V of the symbols of ssa includes the values of each symbolic
event. Since guards are formulas that are part of ssa, V allows us to evaluate the
guards as well. For a valuation V, we write conc(es,V) for the concrete event
corresponding to es, if there is one, i.e., if g(es) evaluates to true under V.
The concretisation of a set S of symbolic events is a set E of concrete events,
as in Sec. 3, s.t. for each e ∈ E there is a symbolic version es in S. We write
conc(S,V) for this concrete set E. The concretisation conc(rs,V) of a symbolic re-
lation rs is the relation {(x, y) | ∃(xs, ys) ∈ rs.x = conc(xs,V)∧y = conc(ys,V)}.
Given an ses γ, conc(γ,V) is the event structure (cf. Sec. 3), whose set of
events is the concretisation of the events of γ w.r.t. V, and whose program order
is the concretisation of po(γ) w.r.t. V. For example, the graph of Fig. 2 (erasing
the rf and fr relations) is a concretisation of the ses of iriw (cf. Fig. 3).
5 Encoding the communication and weak memory
relations symbolically
For an architecture A and an ses γ, we need to represent the communications
(i.e., rf,ws and fr) and the weak memory relations (i.e., ppoA, grfA and abA)
of Sec. 3. We encode them as a formula pord, s.t. ssa ∧ pord is satisfiable iff
there is an execution valid on A violating the property encoded in ssa. We avoid
transitive closures to obtain a small number of constraints. We start with an
informal overview of our approach, then describe how we encode partial orders,
and finally detail the encoding for each relation of Sec. 3.
Overview We present our approach on iriw (Fig. 2) and its ses γ (Fig. 3). In
Fig. 2, we represent only one possible execution, namely the one corresponding
to the (non-SC) final state of the test at the top of the figure. In this section, we
generate constraints representing all the executions of iriw on a given architec-
ture. We give these constraints, for the address x in Fig. 4 in the SC case (for
brevity we skip y, analogous to x). Weakening the architecture removes some
constraints: for Power, we omit the (rf-grf) and (ppo) constraints. For TSO, all
constraints are the same as for SC.
In Fig. 4, each symbol cab is a clock constraint, representing an ordering
between the events a and b. A variable swr represents a read-from between the
write w and the read r.
The constraints of Fig. 4 represent the preserved program order (cf. Sec. 5.4),
e.g., on SC or TSO the read-read pairs (a, b) on P0 (ppo P0) and (c, d) on P1
(ppo P1), but nothing on Power. We generate constraints for the read-from (cf.
Sec. 5.1), for example (rf-some x); the first conjunct si0a ∨ sea concerns the read
a on P0. This means that a can read either from the initial write i0 or from
the write e on P2. The selected read-from pair also implies equalities of the
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(si0a ⇒ x1 = x0) ∧ (si0d ⇒ x2 = x0)∧(rf-val x)
(sea ⇒ x1 = x3) ∧ (sed ⇒ x2 = x3)
(si0a ⇒ ci0a) ∧ (sea ⇒ cea)∧(rf-grf x)
(si0d ⇒ ci0d) ∧ (sed ⇒ ced)
(si0a ∨ sea) ∧ (si0d ∨ sed)(rf-some x)
¬ci0e ⇒ cei0(ws x)
((si0a ∧ ci0e)⇒ cae) ∧ ((si0d ∧ ci0e)⇒ cde)∧(fr x)
((sea ∧ cei0)⇒ cai0) ∧ ((sed ∧ cei0)⇒ cdi0)
ci0i1 (ppo P0) cab (ppo P1) ccd(ppo main)
Fig. 4. Partial order constraints for address x in Fig. 2 on SC
values written and read (rf-val x): for instance, si0a implies that x1 equals the
initialisation x0. The architecture-independent constraints for write serialisation
(cf. Sec. 5.2) and from-read (cf. Sec. 5.3) are specified as (ws x) and (fr x); (ws y)
and (fr y) are analogous. As there are no fences in iriw, we do not generate any
memory fence constraints (cf. Sec. 5.5).
We represent the execution of Fig. 2 as follows. For (e, a) and (i0, d) ∈ grf,
we have the constraint sea ⇒ cea and si0d ⇒ ci0d in (rf-grf x). This means that
a reads from e (as witnessed by sea), and that we record that e is ordered before
a in grf (as witnessed by cea); idem for d and i0. To represent (d, e) ∈ fr, we pick
the appropriate constraint in (fr x), namely (si0d ∧ ci0e)⇒ cde. This reads “if d
reads from i0 and i0 is ordered before e (in ws, because i0 and e are two writes
to x), then d is ordered before e (in fr).”
Together with (ppo P0) and (ppo P1), these constraints represent the exe-
cution in Fig. 2. We cannot find a satisfying assignment of these constraints, as
this leads to both a before b (by (ppo P0)) and b before a (by (fr y), (rf-grf y),
(ppo P1), (fr x) and (grf x)). On Power, however, we neither have the ppo nor
the grf constraints, hence we can find a satisfying assignment.
Symbolic partial orders We associate each symbolic event x of an ses γ with a
unique clock variable clockx (cf. [46,61]) ranging over the naturals. For two events
x and y, we define the Boolean clock constraint as cxy , (g(x) ∧ g(y))⇒ clockx < clocky
(“<” being less-than over the integers). We encode a relation r over the symbolic
events of γ as the formula φ(r) defined as the conjunction of the clock constraints
cxy for all (x, y) ∈ r, i.e., φ(r) ,
∧
(x,y)∈r cxy.
Let C be a valuation of the clocks of the events of γ. Let V be a valuation
of the symbols of the formula ssa associated to γ. As noted in Sec. 4, V gives us
concrete values for the events of γ, and allows us to evaluate their guards. We
show below that (C,V) satisfies φ(r) iff the concretisation of r w.r.t. V is acyclic,
provided that this relation has finite prefixes.
A prefix of x in a relation r is a (possibly infinite) list S = [x0, x1, x2, . . . ]
s.t. x = x0 and for all i, (xi+1, xi) ∈ r (observe that the prefix is reversed
w.r.t. the order imposed by the relation). The relation r has finite prefixes if
for each x, there is a bound l ∈ N to the cardinality of the prefixes of x in r.
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We write card(S) for the cardinality of a list S = [x0, x1, x2, . . . ], i.e., card(S) ,
card({x | ∃i.x = xi}). We write pref(r, x) for the set of prefixes of x in r. Formally,
r has finite prefixes when ∀x.∃l.∀S ∈ pref(r, x). card(S) < l. In our proofs and in
Alg. 4 we denote the concatenation of two lists S1 and S2 by S1++S2.
In the following, we allow symbolic relations with infinite prefixes provided
their concretisations have finite prefixes. Thus we do not consider executions
with an infinite past, or running for more steps than the cardinality of N. Our
first lemma justifies why checking the acyclicity of a concrete relation amounts
to checking the satisfiability of the formula encoding this relation symbolically:
Lemma 1. (C,V) satisfies φ(r) iff conc(r,V) is acyclic and has finite prefixes.
Proof. ⇒: We let rc = conc(r,V). One can show by induction that (∗) if (C,V)
satisfies φ(r) then for all (x, y) ∈ rc+, cxy is true. Now, suppose φ(r) satisfied,
and as a contradiction, rc cyclic, i.e., ∃x.(x, x) ∈ rc+. Thus cxx is true by (∗);
this contradicts the irreflexivity of < over the integers.
Now we show that rc has finite prefixes, i.e., for each x we give a bound l over
all S ∈ pref(rc, x). As a contradiction take S = [x0, . . . xn] ∈ pref(rc, x) s.t. x =
x0 and card(S) > clockx. Thus for all i, we have (xi+1, xi) ∈ rc and clockxi+1 <
clockxi by (∗). Since n ≥ card(S), card(S) > clockx and clockx0 = clockx, we
have clockxn < 0, which contradicts the fact that our clocks are naturals. Thus
for each x we can take l = clockx.
⇐: Let rc = conc(r,V). For all e s.t. g(e) = false, take clocke = 0. Thus cxy
is true if g(x) or g(y) is false. Now, have (x, y) ∈ r with both guards true, i.e.,
(x, y) ∈ rc. Take clockx to be the maximal cardinality of the S in pref(rc, x),
idem for y. We want to prove clockx < clocky. Take S s.t. clockx = card(S).
From (x, y) ∈ rc, we have [y]++S ∈ pref(rc, y). Now, card([y]++S) ≤ clocky
by maximality of clocky. It suffices to prove card(S) < card([y]++S). Suppose
card(S) ≥ card([y]++S). Then y appears in S. Thus (y, x) ∈ rc
+ since S is a
prefix of x; as (x, y) ∈ rc by hypothesis, we have a cycle in rc.
The formula φ(r1 ∪ r2) is equivalent to φ(r1) ∧ φ(r2). Thus we encode unions
of relations, e.g., ghbA , ws ∪ fr ∪ grfA ∪ ppoA ∪abA, as the conjunction of their
respective encodings. By Lem. 1, the acyclicity of ghbA corresponds to the satis-
fiability of φ(ghbs), where ghbs is a symbolic encoding of ghbA. To form φ(ghbs),
we form the conjunction of the formulas φ(r), for r being a symbolic encoding of
ws, fr, grfA, ppoA and abA.
We now present these encodings, in that order. Sec. 3 also relies on the
program order per location for the uniproc check, and the dependencies for
the thin check, omitted for brevity. We compute them alongside the preserved
program order; they use independent sets of clock variables, but the same clock
constraints.
We define auxiliaries over symbolic events: tid(e) is the thread identifier of e,
addr(e) the memory address read from or written to (e.g., x for (e) Rxy), and
val(e) its (symbolic) value. Each algorithm outputs constraints, whose conjunc-
tion we add to pord.
12
input: γ, A output: Cwf , Crf, Cgrf
1 reads := {(α, {r1 . . . rn}) | ri is read ∧ addr(ri) = α}
2 writes := {(α, {w1 . . . wn}) | wi is write ∧ addr(wi) = α}
3 Crf := ∅; Cgrf := ∅; Cwf := ∅
4 foreach α s.t. ∃R,W.(α,R) ∈ reads ∧ (α,W ) ∈ writes do
5 foreach r ∈ R do
6 rf some := ∅
7 foreach w ∈W do
8 if (r, w) 6∈ po(γ) then
9 rf some := rf some ∪ {swr}
10 Cwf := Cwf ∪ {swr ⇒ (g(w) ∧ val(r) = val(w))}
11 Crf := Crf ∪ {swr ⇒ cwr}
12 if (w, r) not relaxed on A and tid(w) 6= tid(r) then
13 Cgrf := Cgrf ∪ {swr ⇒ cwr}
14 Cwf := Cwf ∪ {g(r)⇒
∨
s∈rf some
s}
Algorithm 1: Constraints for read-from
For each algorithm we state and prove a lemma about its correctness. These
follow the scheme of Lem. 1, i.e. we show the encoding correct for any satisfying
valuation of clocks and ssa. Thus we will introduce symbolic encodings of sets
r(γ), where membership in the set is given by a formula and thus depends on
the actual valuation under C and V.
5.1 Read-from
For an architecture A and an ses γ, Alg. 1 encodes the read-from (resp. safe
read-from) as the set of constraints Crf (resp. Cgrf). Following Sec. 3, we add
constraints to Cgrf depending on: first, the relation being within one thread or
between distinct threads (derivable from tid(w) and tid(r)); second, whether A
exhibits store buffering, store atomicity relaxation, or both.
Alg. 1 groups the reads and writes by address, in the sets reads and writes
(lines 1 and 2). For iriw, reads = {(x, {a, d}), (y, {b, c})} and writes = {(x, {i0, e}), (y, {i1, f})}.
The next step forms the potential read-from pairs. To that end, Alg. 1 in-
troduces a free Boolean variable swr for each pair (w, r) of write and read to
the same address (line 9), unless such a pair contradicts program order (line 8).
Indeed, if (w, r) is in rf and (r, w) is in po, this violates the uniproc check of
Sec. 3.
The variable rf some, initialised in line 6, collects the variables swr in line 9.
For iriw, the memory address x, and the read a, we have rf some = {si0a, sea},
i.e., the read a can read either from i0 (the initial write to x), or from the write
e on P2.
Following Sec. 3, each read must read from some write. We ensure this at
line 14, by gathering in Cwf , for a given r, the union of all the potential read-from
swr collected in rf some.
13
Going back to iriw, recall from Sec. 4 that an event has a guard indicating
the branch of the program it comes from. In iriw, the guard of a is true (as all
the others), i.e., the read a is concretely executed. Hence there exists a write
(either i0 or e) from which a reads, as expressed by the constraint si0a ∨ sea
formed at line 14.
If swr evaluates to true (i.e., r reads from w), we record the value constraint
val(r) = val(w) in the set Cwf (line 10). For iriw, we obtain the following for x:
(si0a ⇒ x1 = x0) ∧ (si0d ⇒ x2 = x0) ∧ (sea ⇒ x1 = x3) ∧ (sed ⇒ x2 = x3).
The constraint si0a ⇒ x1 = x0 reads “if si0a is true (i.e., a reads from i0) then
the value x1 read by a equals the value x0 written by i0.”
The constraint added to Crf is such that only if swr evaluates to true, the
clock constraint cwr is enforced (line 11). For iriw we add the following to Crf,
for the address x: (si0a ⇒ ci0a) ∧ (sea ⇒ cea) ∧ (si0d ⇒ ci0d) ∧ (sed ⇒ ced).
If (w, r) is not relaxed on A, we also add its clock constraint cwr to Cgrf
(line 13). In iriw, all reads read from an external thread. Thus on an architec-
ture that does not relax store atomicity (i.e., stronger than Power), we add the
constraints that we added to Crf to Cgrf as well. On Power, Cgrf remains empty.
We now write grfA for both the function over concrete relations given by the
definition of A as in Sec. 3, and the corresponding function over symbolic rela-
tions. Given an architectureA, we have grfA(r) = {(w, r) ∈ r | (w, r) is not relaxed on A}.
For example if A is TSO, all thread-local read-from pairs are relaxed: grfA(r) =
{(w, r) ∈ r | tid(w) 6= tid(r)}. We write (w, r) ∈ WRα when w writes to an ad-
dress α and r reads from the same α, and prf(γ) , {(w, r) ∈
⋃
αWRα | (r, w) 6∈ po(γ)}.
We write rf(γ) for the set {(w, r) ∈ prf(γ) | swr} (with swr of Alg. 1), and grf(γ)
for grfA(rf(γ)). Note that we build the external safe read-from (grfe(γ)) only, i.e.,
between two events from distinct threads. We compute the internal one as part
of ppoA, in Alg. 4.
Given an ses γ, Alg. 1 outputs Crf, Cgrf and Cwf . Let WR be a valuation of
the swr variables of γ. We write inst(rf(γ),WR) (resp. inst(grf(γ),WR)) for rf(γ)
(resp. grfe(γ)) where WR instantiates the swr variables (thus rf(γ) is a symbolic
encoding of the set as noted before this sub-section; we use this notation similarly
in the remainder of this section). We show that Alg. 1 gives the clock constraints
encoding grf (we omit the corresponding lemma for rf):
Lemma 2. (C,V,WR) satisfies
∧
c∈Cwf∪Cgrf
c iff (C,V) satisfies
i) for all r s.t. g(r) is true, there is w s.t. (w, r) ∈ inst(rf(γ),WR) and
ii) for all (w, r) ∈ inst(rf(γ),WR), g(w) is true and val(w) = val(r) and
iii)
∧
(w,r)∈inst(grfe(γ),WR) cwr.
Proof. An induction on R,W s.t. (α,R) ∈ reads and (α,W ) ∈ writes for some
address α, then union for all α shows that Cgrf = {swr ⇒ cwr | (w, r) ∈ prf(γ) ∩
grfeA}, and Cwf =
⋃
r is read
{g(r)⇒
∨
(w,r)∈prf(γ) swr}∪{swr ⇒ (g(w)∧val(r) =
val(w)) | (w, r) ∈ prf(γ)}. The first component of Cwf is equivalent to i); the
second to ii). Cgrf is equivalent to iii).
The model described in Sec. 3 suggests that rf must be encoded to be exclu-
sive, i.e., to link a read to only one write. An explicit encoding thereof, however,
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input: γ output: Cws
1 writes := {(α, {w1 . . . wn}) | wi is write ∧ addr(wi) = α}
2 Cws := ∅; foreach α s.t. ∃W.(α,W ) ∈ writes do
3 foreach w ∈W do
4 foreach w′ ∈ W s.t. tid(w′) 6= tid(w) do
5 Cws := Cws ∪ {¬cww′ ⇒ cw′w}
Algorithm 2: Constraints for write serialisation
would be redundant, as this is already enforced by ws and fr. Hence it suffices
to consider at least one write per read, as Alg. 1 does:
Lemma 3. uniproc(E,X)⇒ ∀r.¬(∃w 6= w′.(w, r) ∈ rf ∧ (w′, r) ∈ rf)
Proof. By contradiction, have w 6= w′ s.t. (w, r) ∈ rf and (w′, r) ∈ rf. By totality
of ws, (w,w′) ∈ ws or (w′, w) ∈ ws. W.l.o.g. have (w,w′) ∈ ws. Then (r, w′) ∈ fr,
i.e., a cycle in rf ∪ fr: w′, r, w′, forbidden by uniproc.
5.2 Write serialisation
Given an ses γ, Alg. 2 encodes the write serialisation ws as the set of constraints
Cws. By definition, ws is a total order over writes to a given address. Alg. 2
implements the totality by ensuring that for two writes w 6= w′ to the same
address either cww′ or cw′w holds. For implementation reasons we choose to
express this as ¬cww′ ⇒ cw′w rather than cww′ ∨ cw′w.
Alg. 2 groups the writes per address. For each address α and write w to
α (lines 2 and 3) we choose another write w′ to α (line 4), and build the dis-
junction of clock constraints over w and w′ (line 5). For iriw we have writes =
{(x, {i0, e}), (y, {i1, f})}, and the constraints: (¬ci0e ⇒ cei0 ) ∧ (¬ci1f ⇒ cfi1).
Note that we build the external ws only (wse). With WWα the pairs of writes
to the address α, and ws(γ) the set {(w,w′) ∈
⋃
αWWα | cw′w = false}, we have
wse(γ) , ws(γ) ∩ {(w,w′) | tid(w) 6= tid(w′)}. We compute the thread-local ws
as part of ppoA, in Alg. 4. Given an input γ of Alg. 2, we now characterise the
clock constraints given by Cws. Basically we show that Alg. 2 gives the clock
constraints enconding ws. The proof (omitted for brevity) is by induction as for
Lem. 2:
Lemma 4. (C,V) satisfies
∧
c∈Cws
c iff it satisfies
∧
(w,w′)∈wse cww′ .
We quantify over all pairs of writes to the same address to build ws. Thus
for w0, w1, w2 in ws in a concrete execution, we build (w0, w1), (w1, w2) and the
redundant (w0, w2) in the symbolic world. This is inherent to the totality of ws.
5.3 From-read
Given an ses γ, Alg. 3 encodes from-read as the set of constraints Cfr. Recall
that (r, w) ∈ fr means ∃w′.(w′, r) ∈ rf ∧ (w′, w) ∈ ws. The existential quantifier
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input: γ output: Cfr
1 reads := {(α, {r1 . . . rn}) | ri is read ∧ addr(ri) = α}
2 writes := {(α, {w1 . . . wn}) | wi is write ∧ addr(wi) = α}
3 Cfr := ∅
4 foreach α s.t. ∃R,W.(α,W ) ∈ writes, (α,R) ∈ reads do
5 foreach (w,w′) ∈ W ×W s.t.w′ 6= w do
6 foreach r ∈ R with tid(r) 6= tid(w) do
7 Cfr := Cfr ∪ {(sw′r ∧ cw′w ∧ g(w))⇒ crw}
Algorithm 3: Constraints for from-read
corresponds to a disjunction:
∨
w′is write(w
′, r) ∈ rf∧ (w′, w) ∈ ws. Since this dis-
junction can be large, which is undesirable in the expression simplification used in
the implementation, we rewrite it as a conjunction of small implications, each of
which are simplified in isolation:
∧
w′is write ((r, w) ∈ fr⇐ (w
′, r) ∈ rf ∧ (w′, w) ∈ ws).
Thus Alg. 3 encodes from-read as a conjunction of the premise variables swr of
Crf and clock variables cww′ of Cws introduced in Alg. 1 and 2.
Again, we collect the sets of reads and writes per address. Alg. 3 considers
triples (w′, w, r) of events to the same address, where (w′, w) is in the write
serialisation, and (w′, r) is in read-from. We enumerate the pairs of writes in
line 5, and then pick a read in line 6. For each such triple we add in line 7 the
clock constraint crw under the premise that i) (w
′, r) ∈ rf, witnessed by sw′r,
ii) (w′, w) ∈ ws, witnessed by cw′w, and that iii) the write w actually takes place
in a concrete execution, i.e., g(w) evaluates to true.
For iriw all guards are true. For x, we obtain: (si0a ∧ ci0e)⇒ cae) ∧ ((si0d ∧
ci0e)⇒ cde) ∧ ((sea ∧ cei0) ⇒ cai0) ∧ ((sed ∧ cei0 )⇒ cdi0 . For example, (si0a ∧
ci0e)⇒ cae, reads “if si0a is true (i.e., if a reads from i0), and if ci0e is true (i.e.,
(i0, e) ∈ ws) then cae is true (i.e., a is in fr before e).”
Given an ses γ, Alg. 3 outputs Cfr. Note that we compute here the external
from-read only (fre), and the internal one as part of ppoA, in Alg. 4. We show
that Alg. 3 gives the clock constraints encoding fr. The (omitted) proof is as for
Lem. 2:
Lemma 5. (C,V,WR) satisfies
∧
c∈Cfr
c iff (C,V) satisfies
∧
(r,w)∈inst(fre(γ),WR) crw.
w0
r
w1
w2
rf
wsfr
fr
ws
Fig. 5. fr derives from rf
and ws
The fr defined above, together with ws, does intro-
duce possible redundancies: given (w0, r) ∈ rf with
(w0, w1) ∈ ws and (w1, w2) ∈ ws, we have both
(r, w1) ∈ fr and (r, w2) ∈ fr – but the latter is redun-
dant as the same ordering is implied by (r, w1) ∈ fr
and (w1, w2) ∈ ws. We could thus, instead, build
a fragment of fr, which we write fr0. We define fr0
as {(r, w1) | ∃w0.(w0, r) ∈ rf ∧ (w0, w1) ∈ ws ∧
∄w′.((w0, w′) ∈ ws∧ (w′, w1) ∈ ws)}. In Fig. 5, (r, w1)
is in fr0 but not (r, w2), because there is a write (w1) in ws between the write
w0 from which r reads and w2. One can show that (r, w) ∈ fr if (r, w) ∈ fr0 or
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input: γ, A output: Cppo
1 Cppo := ∅; foreach S ∈ po(γ) ∧ S 6= ∅ do
2 S = [e]++S′ ∩ {e | e is not fence}
3 chains := [(e, ∅)]; R := true
4 foreach e′ ∈ S′ do
5 T ′ := ∅
6 foreach (e′′, T ′′) ∈ chains s.t. there is no r s.t.
(e′′, r) ∈ T ′ and ((g(e′) ∧ g(e′′) ∧R)⇒ r) do
7 re′′e′ := not relaxA γ (e
′′, e′)
8 if re′′e′ is satisfiable then
9 Cppo := Cppo ∪ {re′′e′ ⇒ ce′′e′}
10 T ′ := T ′ ∪ {(e′′, re′′e′)}
11 foreach (e, r) ∈ T ′′ do
12 if ∃r′.(e, r′) ∈ T ′ then
13 R := R ∧ (ρ⇔ r′ ∨ (re′′e′ ∧ r))
14 T ′ := {(e, ρ)} ∪ T ′ \ (e, r′)
15 else T ′ := {(e, re′′e′ ∧ r)} ∪ T
′
16 chains := [(e′, T ′)]++[chains]
Algorithm 4: Constraints for preserved program order
there exists w′ s.t. (r, w′) ∈ fr0 and (w
′, w) ∈ ws, i.e., we can generate fr from fr0
and ws.
5.4 Preserved program order
For an architecture A and an ses γ, Alg. 4 encodes the preserved program order
as the set Cppo. In Sec. 3, the function ppoA, which is part of the definition of A,
determines if A relaxes a pair (e, e′) in program order in a concrete execution.
For example, RMO and Power relax read-read pairs, but PSO and stronger do
not.
We reuse the notation ppoA for the function collecting non-relaxed pairs in
symbolic program order. Unlike in Sec. 3, the non-relaxed pairs in symbolic pro-
gram order also include the internal safe read-from, internal write serialisation,
internal from-read, and the orderings due to Power’s isync fence. We generate
these constraints here, rather than in Alg. 1–3, to limit the redundancies. We
write ppoA(γ) for ppoA(po-br(γ)), or only ppoA if γ is clear from the context.
Alg. 4 avoids building redundant transitive closure constraints, taking into
account the guards of events: for two events e1, e2, we build a constraint iff
(e1, e2) ∈ ppoA(γ). If, e.g., ppoA(po-br) = po-br (on SC), Alg. 4 creates con-
straints only for neighbouring events in po-br(γ) in each control flow branch of
the program.
As SSA and loop unrolling yield po(γ) (i.e., lists of symbolic events per
thread) rather than po-br(γ) (the corresponding DAG), we cannot construct
Cppo by analysing control flow branches of the program. Building Cppo from
po(γ) requires some more work.
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To build ppoA, Alg. 4 uses the variable chains, a list of pairs (y, T ). For a
given y, its companion set T contains the events x occurring before y in ppoA
+
together with a formula r that characterises all paths of ppoA
+ between x and
y. We build r from formulas re′′e′ asserting that (e
′′, e′) ∈ ppoA, describing
individual steps (e′′, e′) of a path between x and y.
We compute the formula re′′e′ at line 7, using the function not relax. Given an
ses γ and a pair (e′′, e′), not relaxA γ (e′′, e′) returns a formula re′′e′ expressing
the condition under which (e′′, e′) is not relaxed. For PSO or stronger models,
not relax only needs to take the direction of the events and their addresses into
account. For instance, TSO relaxes write-read pairs, but nothing else. If a pair
is necessarily relaxed, not relax returns false, otherwise not relaxA γ (e′′, e′) =
g(e′′) ∧ g(e′). For models weaker than PSO, such as Alpha, RMO or Power,
not relax has to determine data- and control dependencies, and handle Power’s
isync fence. We resolve data dependencies via a definition-use data flow anal-
ysis [5] on the program part in program order between the two events. Control
dependencies use the data dependency analysis to test whether there exists a
branching instruction in program order between the events such that the branch-
ing decision is in data dependency with the first event. For isync, the approach
is similar, except that in addition there must be an isync in program order
between the branch and the second event. We then add the guard of the fence
to the conjunction returned by not relax.
For a given e′, we initialise its companion set T ′ at line 5, then increment it
in lines 10–15. In line 14, we use fresh variables ρ constrained in the formula R
(line 13) to avoid repeating sub-formulas, as is standard in, e.g., CNF encod-
ings [16]. In line 7 we compute the condition re′′e′ for (e
′′, e′) not being relaxed
on A for each e′′ in chains (unless skipped for transitivity, see below). We gener-
ate the constraint re′′e′ ⇒ ce′′e′ iff re′′e′ is satisfiable (line 9), i.e., (e′′, e′) is not
relaxed on A.
Now, suppose e1, e2, e3 on the same thread all in ppoA; the companion set of
e2 is {(e1, re1e2)}, because (e1, e2) ∈ ppoA and there is no other event before e1
on the thread. Suppose that Alg. 4 has already built the beginning of the chain
formed by e1, e2 and e3, so that chains = [(e2, {(e1, re1e2)}), (e1, ∅)] (observe that
the chains are in reverse order of po). At line 4, for each remaining e′ on a given
thread, i.e., e3 in our example, Alg. 4 follows lines 5–9 and adds a constraint
w.r.t. the immediate predecessor e2 of e3 in ppoA. The subsequent elements of
chains (e1 in our example) are also candidates for a clock constraint.
We do not add any constraint if (e1, e3) is guaranteed to be in ppoA
+, as
follows. Any remaining element of chains that belongs to the companion set T ′′
of e′′ is added to T ′ at lines 11–15. As an instance, recall that e1 is in the
companion set of e2. Thus, after generating the constraint ce2e3 at line 9, we
add e1 with its transitivity condition re2e3 ∧ re1e2 to T
′ at line 15. Then, line 6
iterates over the rest of chains, i.e., (e1, ∅). With the updated set T ′ the test
(e1, re1 ) ∈ T
′ yields re1 = re2e3 ∧re1e2 , and thus amounts to checking the validity
of (g(e3) ∧ g(e1)) ⇒ (re2e3 ∧ re1e2). Remember that, unless there is an isync,
the conditions rxy amount to conjunctions over guards, hence in our example we
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are checking the validity of (g(e3) ∧ g(e1)) ⇒ g(e3) ∧ g(e2) ∧ g(e1). If all three
events e1, e2 and e3 are on the same control flow branch, the implication is valid
because all guards are equal. This makes the test of line 6 fail and (e1, e3) will
not be considered for adding another constraint ce1e3 , which would have been
redundant. When the implication is not valid, the test of line 6 succeeds; then
we add another constraint ce1e3 , as this is not redundant here.
This elaboration on guards is essential as witnessed by the following variant
of our example: assume, in contrast to the above, that e2 is not a dominator of
e3 on the control flow graph. This might occur in a program fragment (if e1
then e2); e3, where the guard of e2 would be different from that of e1 or e3. If
we were to skip (e1, e3) as above, the constraints would be insufficient to enforce
the order of e1 before e3 when g(e2) evaluates to false. In this case, the premises
g(e1) ∧ g(e2) and g(e2) ∧ g(e3) of ce1e2 and ce2e3 , respectively, are false, hence
the clock constraints clocke1 < clocke2 and clocke2 < clocke3 are not enforced,
leaving the order of (e1, e3) unconstrained.
We illustrate Alg. 4 on the ses γ of iriw (cf. Fig. 3). Alg. 4 proceeds over
po(γ), equal to {[i0, i1], [a, b], [c, d], [e], [f ]} for iriw. Given a non-empty list S
of po(γ), e.g., S = [a, b] corresponding to P0, the first non-fence event a of S
initialises at line 3 the variable chains (explained below in detail). The loop at
line 4 proceeds with the tail S′ of the list S. Thus for P0 at this point we have
chains = [(a, ∅)] and Alg. 4 proceeds with S′ = [b].
The contents of chains depend on the architecture A, as iriw shows. For P0,
recall that chains = [(a, ∅)] and only b remains in S′. If A relaxes read-read
pairs, e.g., RMO or weaker, then (a, b) is relaxed. Thus we do not add any clock
constraint to Cppo at line 9 and eventually chains = [(b, ∅), (a, ∅)] in line 16.
If A does not relax read-read pairs, e.g., PSO or stronger, we add cab to Cppo
at line 9 and add a with the guard conjunction true to T ′ at line 15. Thus
chains = [(b, {(a, true)}), (a, ∅)]. Let us now characterise the output of Alg. 4,
given an input ses γ:
Lemma 6. Alg. 4 outputs {rxy ⇒ cxy | (x, y) ∈ ppoA}.
Proof. We write L1 (resp. L2) for the loop from line 4 to 16 (resp. 6 to 15). L1
maintains the invariant that S = rd(chains)++S′, where rd reverses its argument
and deletes T for each element (e, T ) of its argument. We write pathex,y(e1, . . . , en)
when there is a path from x to y in ppoA(γ) passing by e, i.e., e1 = x and
en = y and ∀i.(ei, ei+1) ∈ ppoA(γ) and ∃i.ei = e. L2 maintains the invariant
that T ′ =
⋃
e∈[e′′,e′] T
e′
e , where e ∈ [e
′′, e′] means (e′′, e) ∈ po∧(e, e′) ∈ po, and
T e
′
e = {(x, rx) | rx =
∨
pathex,y(e1,...,en)
∧
1≤i≤n reiei+1}. We conclude by double
inclusion of Cppo and {rxy ⇒ cxy | (x, y) ∈ ppoA}, omitted for brevity.
Since the rxy are guard conditions, we just need to evaluate the guards to
evaluate them. We show that Alg. 4 gives the clock constraints encoding ppo;
the proof is immediate by Lem. 6:
Lemma 7. (C,V) satisfies
∧
c∈Cppo
c iff it satisfies
∧
(x,y)∈ppoA
cxy.
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input: γ, A output: Cab′
1 Cab′ := ∅; foreach S ∈ po(γ) ∧ S 6= ∅ do
2 fences := {s | s ∈ S ∧ s is fence}
3 foreach e ∈ S \ fences do
4 foreach s ∈ fences do
5 if (e, s) ∈ po(γ) then
6 Cab′ := Cab′ ∪ {g(s)⇒ ces}
7 if A is not store atomic then
8 foreach (w, e) being a w-r pair s.t. addr(w) = addr(e) and
tid(w) 6= tid(e) do
9 Cab′ := Cab′ ∪ {(g(s) ∧ swe)⇒ cws}
10 else Cab′ := Cab′ ∪ {g(s)⇒ cse}
11 if A is not store atomic then
12 foreach (e, r) being a w-r pair s.t. addr(e) = addr(r) and
tid(e) 6= tid(r) do
13 Cab′ := Cab′ ∪ {(g(s) ∧ ser)⇒ csr}
Algorithm 5: Constraints for memory fences
5.5 Memory fences and cumulativity
Given an architecture A and an ses γ, Alg. 5 encodes the fence orderings as the
set Cab′ . A fence s potentially induces orderings over all (e, e
′) s.t. e is in po
before s and e′ after s, which is quadratic in the number of events in po for
each fence. Cumulativity constraints depend on the read-from to appear in the
concrete event structure, and again these are paired with all events before or
after (in po) a fence. We alleviate this with the fence events (see below). The
implementation supports x86’s mfence and Power’s sync, lwsync and isync.
We handle isync as part of ppo in Alg. 4. We first present x86’s mfence and
Power’s sync, then lwsync.
Fences mfence and sync Alg. 5 applies its procedure to po(γ) (line 1). For exam-
ple, assume sync fences between the read-read pairs of P0 and P1 of iriw, associ-
ated with the fences events s0 and s1. We then have po(γ) = {[i0, i1], [a, s0, b], [c, s1, d], [e], [f ]}.
For each list S of po(γ) (i.e., per thread), we compute at line 2 the set fences,
containing the fence events of S. For iriw, fences is empty for P2 and P3. For P0,
we have fences = {s0}, and {s1} for P1. We test at line 5 for each pair (e, s) s.t.
e is a non-fence event and s is fence whether (e, s) is in program order, or rather
(s, e). We then build the according non-cumulative constraints, and constraints
for A-cumulativity (for (e, s) in program order) or B-cumulativity (otherwise).
For non-cumulativity, if e is before (resp. after) s in program order, Alg. 5
produces at line 6 the clock constraint ces (resp. cse at line 10). In iriw, all
guards are true, hence we generate cas0 (resp. ccs1) for the event a (resp. c) in po
before the fence s0 (resp. s1) on P0 (resp. P1). Line 10 generates cs0b (resp. cs1d)
for b (resp. d), in po after the fence s0 (resp. s1) on P0 (resp. P1).
IfA relaxes store atomicity, we build cumulativity constraints. For A-cumulativity,
Alg. 5 adds at line 9 the constraint swe ⇒ cws, for each (w, e) s.t. e is in po before
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the fence s, and e reads from the write w. The constraint reads “if g(s) is true
(i.e., the fence is concretely executed) and if swe is true (i.e., e reads from w),
then cws is true (i.e., there is a global ordering, due to the fence s, from w to s)”.
All other constraints, i.e., the actual ordering of w before some event e′ in po
after s, follow by transitivity. We handle B-cumulativity in a similar way, given
in lines 12 and 13.
As Power relaxes store atomicity, the sync fences between the read-read pairs
of iriw create A-cumulativity constraints, namely for s0 (and analogous ones for
s1): (si0a ⇒ ci0s0) ∧ (sea ⇒ ces0).
If we were not using fence events, we would create a clock constraint cwe′ for
every e′ in program order after the fence s to implement Sec. 3, for each fence s.
Thus the non-cumulative part would be cubic already, whereas fence events yield
a quadratic number at most. For cumulativity, we would obtain a constraint for
every pair (r, e′) s.t. (w, r) ∈ rfe and r is in po before the fence s. The resulting
number of constraints is the number of such pairs (r, e′) times the number of
pairs (w, r), i.e., cubic in the number of events per fence s. Furthermore cases of
both A- and B-cumulativity at the same fence s need to be taken into account,
resulting in even higher complexity. Fence events, however, reduce all these cases,
including the combined one, to cubic complexity (all triples of external writes,
reads, and fence events).
w1
r1
lwsyncr lwsyncw
w2
r2
Fig. 6. Constraints for
lwsync
Fence lwsync As lwsync does not order write-read
pairs (cf. Sec. 3), we need to avoid creating a con-
straint cwr between a write w and a read r separated
by an lwsync. To do so, we use two distinct clock vari-
ables clockrs and clock
w
s for an lwsync s. This avoids
the wrong transitive constraint cwr implied by cws
and csr. Fig. 6 illustrates this setup: the write-read
pair (w1, r2) will not be ordered by any of the con-
straints, but all other pairs are ordered.
To create a clock constraint in lines 6, 9, 10, or 13,
we then pick one or both of the clock variables, as fol-
lows. If e is a read, the clock constraint is clocke < clock
r
s when e is before s,
i.e., lines 6 or 9 (or clockrs < clocke if e is after, i.e., lines 10 or 13). If e is a write
preceding s (i.e., lines 6 or 9), the clock constraint is clocke < clock
w
s . Finally,
if e is a write after s, i.e., lines 10 or 13, the clock constraint is the conjunc-
tion (clockws < clocke) ∧ (clock
r
s < clocke). To make lwsync non-cumulative (cf.
footnote in Sec. 3), we just need to disable the lines 8,9,12 and 13.
In iriw, if we use lwsync instead of sync as discussed above, we obtain the
following constraints: (clocka < clock
r
s0
) ∧ (clockrs0 < clockb) ∧ (si0a ⇒ clocki0 <
clockws0)∧(sea ⇒ clocke < clock
w
s0
). These constraints will not order the writes i0
or e with the read b, because i0 and e are ordered w.r.t. to clock
w
s0
, but b is only
ordered w.r.t. the distinct clockrs0 . This corresponds to the fact that placing
lwsync fences in iriw does not forbid the non-SC execution.
Given an ses γ, Alg. 5 outputs Cab′ . We let rfe(γ) be {(w, r) ∈
⋃
αWRα |
tid(w) 6= tid(r) ∧ swr}. We write ab
′(γ) for {(e1, e2) | nc′(e1, e2) ∨ ac′(e1, e2) ∨
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bc′(e1, e2)}, where nc′(e1, e2) corresponds to non-cumulativity, i.e., (e1, e2) ∈
po(γ)∧((g(e1)∧e1 is fence)∨(g(e2)∧e2 is fence))∧not both e1 and e2 are fences,
ac′(e1, e2) to A-cumulativity, i.e., ∃r.(e1, r) ∈ rfe(γ) ∧ (r, e2) ∈ po(γ) ∧ g(e2) ∧
e2 is fence, and bc
′(e1, e2) corresponds to B-cumulativity, i.e., ∃w.(w, e2) ∈ rfe(γ)∧
(e1, w) ∈ po(γ) ∧ g(e1) ∧ e1 is fence. We show that Alg. 5 gives the clock con-
straints encoding ab′. The proof is immediate like for Lem. 2:
Lemma 8. (C,V,WR) satisfies
∧
c∈Cab′
c iff (C,V) satisfies
∧
(x,y)∈inst(ab′(γ),WR) cxy.
We let ab(γ) be the symbolic version of ab in Sec. 3, i.e., we let nc(e1, s, e2)
be g(s)∧ s is fence ∧ (e1, s) ∈ po(γ)∧ (s, e2) ∈ po(γ), ac(e1, s, e2) be ∃r.(e1, r) ∈
rfe(γ)∧nc(r, s, e2) and bc(e1, s, e2) be ∃w. nc(e1, s, w)∧ (w, e2) ∈ rfe(γ). We only
prove this encoding sound w.r.t. Sec. 3, as ab′ is more fine-grained than ab (to
see why, note that one cannot express nc′(e1, e2) as a combination of nc, ac or
bc). Yet we prove our overall encoding complete in Thm. 1.
Lemma 9. If (C,V,WR) satisfies
∧
c∈Cab′
c then (C,V) satisfies
∧
(e1,e2)∈inst(ab(γ),WR)
ce1e2 .
Proof. We give only the case lwsync(γ). Take (e1, e2) ∈ lwsync(γ), i.e., there is
an lwsync s s.t. nc(e1, s, e2) or ac(e1, s, e2) or bc(e1, s, e2). In the nc case, we
know that s is a fence and g(s) is true, and (e1, s) ∈ po(γ) and (s, e2) ∈ po(γ),
i.e., nc′(e1, s) and nc
′(s, e2). Thus ce1s and cse2 are in Cab′ . Now, by definition
of lwsync(γ), (e1, e2) 6∈ WR. For (e1, e2) ∈ WW, ce1s is clocke1 < clock
w
s and
cse2 is clock
w
s < clocke2 . Thus clocke1 < clocke2 , i.e., ce1e2 holds. Writing RR
for the read-read pairs, take (e1, e2) ∈ RR. Thus ce1s is clocke1 < clock
r
s and cse2
is clockrs < clocke2 . Hence clocke1 < clocke2 , i.e., ce1e2 holds. For (e1, e2) ∈ RW,
ce1s is clocke1 < clock
r
s and cse2 is (clock
w
s < clocke2 ) ∧ (clock
r
s < clocke2). Thus
clocke1 < clocke2 , i.e., ce1e2 holds. In the ac case, s is a fence and g(s) is true,
and there is r s.t. (e1, r) ∈ rfe(γ) and nc(r, s, e2). Thus e1 is a write (source
of a rf), and since (e1, e2) 6∈ WR (by definition of lwsync(γ)), e2 is a write.
So ac′(e1, s), and nc
′(s, e2), i.e., ce1s and cse2 hold. We are back to the WW
case. In the bc case, s is a fence and g(s) is true, and there is w s.t. nc(e1, s, w)
and (w, e2) ∈ rfe(γ). Thus e2 is a read (target of a rf), and since (e1, e2) 6∈WR,
e1 is a read. So nc
′(e1, s) and bc
′(s, e2), i.e., ce1s and cse2 hold. We are back to
the RR case.
5.6 Soundness and completeness of the encoding
Given an architecture A and a program, the procedure of Sec. 4 and Sec. 5
outputs a formula ssa ∧ pord and an ses γ. This formula provably encodes the
executions of this program valid on A and violating the property encoded in ssa
in a sound and complete way. Proving this requires proving that any assignment
to the system corresponds to a valid execution of the program, and vice versa.
This result requires three steps, one for uniproc, one for thin and one for the
acyclicity of ghb. By lack of space, we show only the last one. Given an ses γ,
we write φ for
∧
c∈Cppo∪Cgrf∪Cwf∪Cws∪Cab′
c:
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Theorem 1. The formula ssa ∧ φ is satisfiable iff there are V, a valuation to
the symbols of ssa, and a well formed X s.t. ghbA(conc(γ,V), X) is acyclic and
has finite prefixes.
Proof. Let (C,V,WR) be a satisfying assignment of ssa ∧ φ. By Lem. 7, 2, 4,
5 and 8, we know that (C,V,WR) satisfies φ iff i) for all r s.t. g(r) is true,
there is w s.t. (w, r) ∈ inst(rf(γ),WR) and ii) for all (w, r) ∈ inst(rf(γ),WR),
g(w) is true and val(w) = val(r) and iii) (C,V,WR) satisfies φ(ppoA(γ)) ∧
φ(inst(grf(γ),WR)) ∧ φ(wse(γ)) ∧ φ(inst(fr(γ),WR)) ∧ φ(inst(ab′(γ),WR)).
⇒: Take X = (conc(inst(rf(γ),WR),V)), (conc(ws(γ),V)). Note that i) and
ii), together with Lem. 3, imply that rf(X) is well formed. For ws(X), this comes
from the totality of ws(γ) over writes to the same address, implied by the shape of
Cws (cf. Alg. 2) for the external ws, and by the totality of po(γ) for the internal
ws.
By Lem. 8 and 9, iii) says that (C,V,WR) satisfies φ(r), with r = ppoA(γ) ∪
inst(grfA(γ),WR) ∪ ws(γ) ∪ inst(fr(γ),WR) ∪ inst(ab(γ),WR). By Lem. 1, since
ghbA(conc(γ,V), X) is conc(r,V), we have our result.
⇐: We let E be conc(γ,V). Take WR s.t. swr is true iff (w, r) ∈ rf(X). rf(X)
being well-formed implies i) and ii).
We let ghb′A(E,X) be r1∪ab
′(E,X), with r1 = ppoA(E)∪grfA(X)∪ws(X)∪
fr(E,X). Note that ghbA(E,X) is r1∪ab(E,X). We show below that the acyclic-
ity of ghbA(E,X) implies the acyclicity of ghb
′
A(E,X) ( idem for finite pre-
fixes). Then we take r = ghb′A(E,X) in Lem. 1, and take C as in Lem. 1.
Hence we have (C,V) satisfying φ(ppoA(γ)) ∧ φ(inst(grf(γ),WR)) ∧ φ(wse(γ)) ∧
φ(inst(fr(γ),WR)) ∧ φ(inst(ab′(γ),WR)), namely iii); our result follows.
We let r2 = {(e1, e2) ∈ ab
′; ab′ | neither e1 nor e2 is a fence}). We write
(x, y) ∈ r; r’ for ∃z.(x, z) ∈ r ∧ (z, y) ∈ r’. One can show: (∗) if (e1, e2) ∈ ghb
′+,
we have (e1, e2) in ab
′; (r1
+ ∪ r2+)
+
, or (r1
+ ∪ r2+)
+
; ab′, or (r1
+ ∪ r2+)
+
.
Acyclicity: by contradiction, take a cycle in ghb′A(E,X), i.e., x s.t. (x, x) ∈
(ghb′A(E,X))
+
. In the first two cases (∗), ab′ connects two non-fence events,
a contradiction. Hence a cycle in ghb′ implies one in r1 ∪ r2, i.e., in ghb since
r2 ⊆ ab.
Prefixes: as a contradiction, take an infinite path in ghb′A(E,X)
+
. Only the
cases (r1
+ ∪ r2+)
+
and ab′; (r1
+ ∪ r2+)
+
of (∗) apply, and both imply an infinite
path in (r1
+ ∪ r2+)
+
. Hence, we have an infinite prefix in ghb+, since r2 ⊆ ab.
To decide the satisfiability of φ, we can use any solver supporting a sufficiently
rich fragment of first-order logic. The procedure reveals the concrete executions,
as expressed by Thm. 1.
5.7 Comparison to [14] and [61,62]
Both [14] and [61,62] use an SSA encoding similar to our ssa of Sec. 4. The
difference resides in the ordering constraints.
[14] encodes total orders over memory accesses. Thus, in contrast to our
clock variables with less-than constraints, [14] uses a Boolean variable Mxy per
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pair (x, y), whose value places x and y in a total order: either x before y, or y
before x. Prog. 1 has 3 · N memory accesses per thread, hence [14]’s encoding
has 6 ·N · (6 ·N− 1) Boolean variables. [14] builds additional constraints for the
transitive closure; their number is at least cubic in the number of variablesMxy,
leading to O(N6) constraints.
We only consider relations per address, except for program order and fence
orderings, and do not build transitive closures. The constraints for fr and ab are
cubic in the worst case; all others are quadratic. In Prog. 1, the write serialisation
is internal, hence fr is only quadratic. Hence our number of constraints is O(N2).
[61,62] use partial orders like us; they note redundancies in their constraints
in [62] but do not explain them, which we do below. Basically, [61,62] quantify
over all events regardless of their address, whereas we mostly build constraints
per address. Fig. 7 shows that the maximal number of events to a single address
is experimentally much smaller than the total number of events.
Our notations correspond to the ones of [62] as follows (the original de-
scription [61] has different notations). HB(a, b) is our clock constraint cab. The
functions addr and val map to ours; en(x) is our g(x); link(r, w) denotes that r
reads from w, i.e., our swr. [62] expresses po, rf, fr, and ws as follows (since it is
restricted to SC, it gives no encoding of ppoA, grfA, and abA).
[62] encodes po as the conjunction of the caiaj , with ai in po before aj . If the
implementation of [62] strictly follows this definition, it redundantly includes the
transitive closure constraints, which we avoid by building the transitive reduction
in Alg. 4.
[62] encodes rf in Π1 := ∀r.∃w. g(r)⇒ (g(w) ∧ swr) and Π2 := ∀r.∀w.swr ⇒
(cwr ∧ addr(r) = addr(w) ∧ val(r) = val(w)). [62] forces rf to be exclusive. We
explained in Sec. 5.1 why this is unnecessary in our case, which allows us to only
build a disjunction over writes (cf. Alg. 1) linear in their number.
Π2 combines our value and clock constraints, with one major difference: Π2
ranges over all reads and writes, regardless of their address. Our rf (Alg. 1)
ranges over pairs to the same address, thus reaches this number only when all
reads and writes have the same memory address, which is unlikely in non-trivial
programs.
Ranging over the same address, as we do, and not all addresses, as in [62],
becomes even more advantageous in Π3, encoding fr: Π3 := ∀r.∀w.∀w′.(swr ⇒
(g(w′) ∧ ¬cw′w ∧ ¬crw′ ⇒ addr(r) 6= addr(w′)). Π3 ranges over all (r, w, w′),
again independently of their addresses. For distinct addresses the conjunction
holds trivially, but [62] builds it nevertheless. Our fr (cf. Alg. 3) quantifies only
over the same address, thus spares these trivial constraints.
[62] does not encode ws. The totality of ws comes as a side effect: [62] ini-
tialises each write with a unique integer, hence writes are totally ordered by <
over integers. This is again regardless of the addresses, whereas we order writes
to the same address only.
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6 Experimental Results
We detail here our experiments, which indicate that our technique is scalable
enough to verify non-trivial, real-world concurrent systems code, including the
worker-synchronisation logic of the relational database PostgreSQL, code for
socket-handover in the Apache httpd, and the core API of the Read-Copy-
Update mutual exclusion code from Linux 3.2.21.
We implement our technique within the bounded model checker CBMC [18],
using a SAT solver as an underlying decision procedure. We see two primary
comparison points to estimate the overhead introduced by the partial order
constraints. First, we pass the benchmarks with a single, fixed interleaving
to sequential CBMC. Our implementation performs comparably to sequential
CBMC, as Fig. 7 shows (rows “sequential” and “concurrent”). Second, we com-
pare to ESBMC [19], which also implements bounded model checking, but uses
interleaving-based techniques.
In Fig. 7, we gather facts about all examples: the Fibonacci example from
[11] with N=5, 4500 litmus tests (see below), the worker synchronisation in Post-
greSQL, RCU, and fdqueue in Apache httpd. For each we give the number of lines
of code (LOC), the number of distinct memory addresses “tot. addr” (including
unused shared variables), the total number of shared accesses “tot. shared”, the
maximal number of accesses to a single address “same addr”, the total num-
ber of constraints “all constr” and the relation with the most costly encoding, in
terms of the number of constraints generated. We give the loop unrolling bounds
“unroll”: we write “none” when there is no loop, and “bounded” when the loops
in the program are natively bounded.
The total number of shared accesses is on average 13 times the maximal
number of accesses to a single address. The most costly constraint is usually the
read-from, or the barriers, which build on read-from. The time needed by our
tool to analyse a program grows with the total number of constraints generated.
ESBMC is 4 times slower than our tool on Fibonacci, 3050 times slower on the
litmus tests, times out on PostgreSQL, and cannot parse RCU and Apache.
Fibo. Litmus PgSQL RCU Apache
LOC 41 50.9 5412 5834 28864
unroll 5 none 2 bounded 5
tot. addr 2 11.8 6 3 8
tot. shared 45 58.7 233 107 88
same addr 11 3.7 72 4 5
all constr 308 874 3762 90 160
most costly rf (178) ab (342) rf (1868) rf (33) rf (49)
sequential 0.3 s 0.1 s 4.1 s 0.8 s 1.7 s
concurrent 3.3 s 0.2 s 90.0 s 1.0 s 2.8 s
ESBMC 13.8 s 609.8 s t/o parse err parse err
Fig. 7. Facts about all examples
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CBMC CBMC CBMC CheckFence CImpact ESBMC Poirot SatAbs Threader
SC TSO Power SC, TSO SC SC SC SC SC
F CE N = 300 CE N = 220 CE N = 240 conv err t/o N = 1 CE N = 10 fails N ≥ 1 V N = 3 t/o N = 1
L 100% 100% 100% 18% 20% 34% 47% 100% 8%
P V V CE conv err aborts t/o parse err t/o n/a
Pf V V V conv err aborts t/o parse err t/o n/a
R V V V conv err aborts parse err parse err ref err n/a
A V V V conv err aborts parse err parse err aborts n/a
Fig. 8. Comparison of all tools on all examples (time out 30mins)
Other tools There are very few tools for verifying concurrent C programs, even
on SC [21]. For weak memory, existing techniques are restricted to TSO, and its
siblings PSO and RMO [14,44,43,9,3,49]. Not all of them have been implemented,
and only few handle systems code given as C programs.
Thus, as a further comparison point, we implemented an instrumentation
technique [7], similar to [9]. The technique of [9] is restricted to TSO, and consists
in delaying writes, so that the SC executions of the instrumented code simulate
the TSO executions of the original program. Our instrumentation handles all
the models of Sec. 3.
We tried 5 ANSI-C model checkers: SatAbs, a verifier based on predicate
abstraction [17]; ESBMC; CImpact, a variant of the Impact algorithm [52] ex-
tended to SC concurrency; Threader, a thread-modular verifier [34]; and Poirot,
which implements a context-bounded translation to sequential programs [45].
These tools cover a broad range of techniques for verifying SC programs. We
also tried CheckFence [14].
In Fig. 8, we compare all tools on all examples: F for Prog. 1, L for the
litmus tests, P for PostgreSQL with its bug, Pf for our fix, R for RCU and A for
Apache. For L, P, R and A, the bounds are as in Fig. 7; for Pf we take the one of
P. For F we try the maximal N that the tool can handle within the time out of
30 mins. For each tool, we specify the model below. We write “t/o” when there
is a timeout. We write “fail” when the tool gives a wrong answer. CheckFence
provides a conversion module from C to its internal representation; we write
“conv err” when it fails. We write “parse err” when the tool cannot parse the
example. SatAbs uses a refinement procedure; we write “ref err” when it fails.
When a tool verifies an example we write “V”; when it finds a counterexample
we write “CE”.
Fibonacci All tools, except for ESBMC, SatAbs and ours, fail to analyse Fi-
bonacci. Poirot claims the assertion is violated for any N, which is not the case
for 1 ≤ N ≤ 5. SatAbs does not reach beyond N = 4. Our tool handles more
than N = 300, which is 30 times more loop unrolling than ESBMC, within the
same amount of time.
Litmus tests We analyse 4500 tests exposing weak memory artefacts, e.g., in-
struction reordering, store buffering, store atomicity relaxation. These tests are
generated by the diy tool [8], which generates assembly programs with a final
state unreachable on SC, but reachable on a weaker model. For example, iriw
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(Fig. 2) can only be reached on RMO (by reordering the reads) or on Power
(idem, or because the writes are non-atomic).
We convert these tests into C code, of 50 lines on average, involving 2 to 4
threads. Despite the small size of the tests, they prove challenging to verify, as
Fig. 8 shows: most tools, except Blender, SatAbs and ours, give wrong results
or fail in other ways on a vast majority of tests, even for SC. For each tool we
give the average percentage of correct results over all models. Our tool verifies
all tests on all models in 0.22 s on average.
PostgreSQL Developers observed that a regression test failed on a PowerPC ma-
chine4, and later identified the memory model as possible culprit: the processor
could delay a write by a thread until after a token signalling the end of this
thread’s work had been set. Our tool confirmed the bug, and proved a patch we
proposed. A detailed description of the problem is in [7].
RCU Read-Copy-Update (RCU) is a synchronisation mechanism of the Linux
kernel, introduced in version 2.5. Writers to a concurrent data structure prepare
a fresh component (e.g., list element), then replace the existing component by
adjusting the pointer variable linking to it. Clean-up of the old component is
delayed until there is no process reading.
Thus readers can rely on very lightweight (and thus fast) lock-free synchro-
nisation only. The protection of reads against concurrent writes is fence-free on
x86, and uses only a light-weight fence (lwsync) on Power. We verify the original
implementation of the 3.2.21 kernel for x86 (5824 lines) and Power (5834 lines)
in less than 1 s, using a harness that asserts that the reader will not obtain an
inconsistent version of the component. On Power, removing the lwsync makes
the assertion fail.
Apache The Apache httpd is the most widely used HTTP server software. It
supports a broad range of concurrency APIs distributing incoming requests to a
pool of workers.
The fdqueue module (28864 lines) is the central part of this mechanism,
which implements the hand-over of a socket together with a memory pool to an
idle worker. The implementation uses a central, shared queue for this purpose.
Shared access is primarily synchronised by means of an integer keeping track
of the number of idle workers, which is updated via architecture-dependent
compare-and-swap and atomic decrement operations. Hand-over of the socket
and the pool and wake-up of the idle thread is then coordinated by means of a
conventional, heavy-weight mutex and a signal. We verify that hand-over guar-
antees consistency of the payload data passed to the worker in 2.45 s on x86 and
2.8 s on Power.
4 http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2011-08/msg00330.php
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7 Conclusion
Our experiments demonstrate that weakness is a virtue for programs with bounded
loops. Our proofs suggest that this contention is not limited to bounded loops,
but impracticable as is, since it involves infinite structures. Thus we believe that
this work opens up new possibilities for over-approximation for programs with
unbounded loops, which we hope to investigate in the future.
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